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 A half-century of Rawls interpreters have overemphasized economic equality in A Theory 
of Justice, slighting liberty—the central value of liberalism—in the process. From luck-egalitarian 
readings of Rawls to more recent claims that Rawls was a “reticent socialist,” these interpretations 
have obscured Rawls’s identity as a philosopher of freedom.1 They have also obscured the perhaps 
surprising fact that Rawlsian liberties (basic and non-basic) restrain and even undermine that same 
economic equality. Such undermining occurs in three areas: first, in the lexical priority of the basic 
liberties; second, in the (underappreciated) role played by free and competitive markets in Rawls’s 
theory; and third, in the structure and functioning of Rawls’s preferred economic institutions, viz., 
liberal socialism and property-owning democracy. 
 Rawls famously gives special protection to basic liberties in his theory by assigning lexical 
(i.e., lexicographic) priority to the principle of equal basic liberty over fair equality of opportunity 
and the difference principle. The priority of liberty, so understood, means that basic liberties such 
as freedom of speech, liberty of conscience, and the right to vote can only be limited for the sake 
of the basic liberties themselves, whether individually or as a mutually consistent system, not for 
the sake of socioeconomic equality or values beyond justice as fairness (e.g., utility, perfection).2 
The tension between basic liberty and economic equality is thus built into the very foundations of 
Rawls’s theory. 
We might be tempted to think that, despite this apparent tension, the values these principles 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 60-75, and William A. Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). 
2 For a full explication and defense of the priority of liberty, see Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian 
Foundations of Justice as Fairness (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2011), Chapters 3 and 4. 
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protect are so unrelated to each other that no real conflict arises, but this would be a major mistake. 
For example, consider hate speech, understood as a species of group libel: speech (oral or written) 
that argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical inferiority of members of particular historically-
oppressed groups (e.g., blacks, women, Jews, and homosexuals). Suppose that a statute is proposed 
to punish hate speech (maybe only with fines) on the grounds that its spread would severely hinder 
implementation of fair equality of opportunity: the dissemination of racially and sexually bigoted 
doctrines in a citizenry—especially among employers and college-admissions committees—would 
hamper the matching of people and their aptitudes with suitable offices and positions in the basic 
structure of society. Such worries over hate speech’s contribution to socioeconomic inequality can 
be found throughout the philosophical and legal literatures and in case law, especially the landmark 
group-libel case Beauharnais v. Illinois.3 Due to its motivation, this statute would contravene the 
priority of liberty: free speech cannot be limited solely for the sake of social mobility.4 Respect for 
the basic liberties can therefore undercut economic equality in a tangible way; the tension between 
them is not merely theoretical. 
 Less well-known than the priority of liberty—even among Rawls scholars—is the vital role 
played in justice as fairness by free and competitive markets, especially for labor. Rawls reveals a 
remarkably robust commitment to removing official barriers to entry in labor markets, be they in 
the form of restrictive professional licensing, minimum-wage laws, etc.5 For those accustomed to 
                                                 
3 The Supreme Court case Beauharnais v. Illinois (343 U.S. 250 [1952]) upheld an Illinois group-defamation statute 
that criminalized the exhibition or publication of pictures or writings that portrayed “depravity, criminality, unchastity, 
or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion.” Writing for the Court, Felix Frankfurter 
argued that “a man’s job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the 
reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits.” 
4 Robert S. Taylor, “Hate Speech, the Priority of Liberty, and the Temptations of Nonideal Theory,” Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 15 (June 2012): 353-68. 
5 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 




thinking of Rawls as an economic interventionist, these free-market passages can be disorienting, 
even disconcerting, but they follow quite readily, in fact, from his other theoretical commitments. 
Fair equality of opportunity includes formal equality of opportunity (careers open to talents), and 
the latter is underwritten by a pair of non-basic liberties: freedom of movement and free choice of 
occupation.6 Barriers to entry in labor markets, whether erected by private or public agents, prevent 
full realization of these liberties and of the associated labor-market opportunities. For Rawls, free 
and competitive labor markets, guaranteed by freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, 
are the sine qua non of careers open to talents. 
 Again, however, Rawlsian liberties undermine economic equality here, in this case income 
equality.7 Rawls himself points out this implication in a passage somewhat reminiscent of Hayek: 
A further and more significant advantage of a market system is that…it is consistent 
with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Citizens have a free choice of 
careers and occupations. There is no reason at all for the forced and central direction 
of labor. Indeed, in the absence of some differences in earnings as these arise in a 
competitive scheme, it is hard to see how, under ordinary circumstances anyway, 
certain aspects of a command society inconsistent with liberty can be avoided.8 
In order for labor markets to clear, wages need to be free-floating; thus, free and open competition 
                                                 
6 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 303-58, here 313. 
7 Fair equality of opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle; consequently, if these Rawlsian (non-basic) 
liberties are preconditions for attaining it, their full realization is a requirement of justice—even if it results in income 
inequalities that would otherwise be inconsistent with the difference principle. On this point, see Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 73, 77, 264-6, and Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls, Chapter 5. 
8 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 240-1; emphasis added. In a similar passage, Hayek remarks that “once the rewards the 
individual can expect are no longer an appropriate indication of how to direct their efforts to where they are most 
needed, because these rewards correspond not to the value which their services have for their fellows, but to the moral 
merit or desert the persons are deemed to have earned, they lose the guiding function they have in the market order 
and would have to be replaced by the commands of the directing authority.” See Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation, 
and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 82. 
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for offices and positions in the basic structure will inevitably lead to “differences in earnings,” i.e., 
income inequality. Such inequality is the price to be paid for the realization of essential non-basic 
liberties, and Rawls deems it a price worth paying. 
 Rawls’s willingness to trade off economic equality for liberty persists in his more detailed 
discussions of economic institutions. He rejects outright the central planning, command economy, 
and displacement of markets characteristic of state socialism for the reasons surveyed immediately 
above: they are not only grossly inefficient but also (and more importantly) inconsistent with both 
basic and non-basic liberties, a conclusion supported by copious hard evidence from a sanguinary 
twentieth century.9 By contrast, both liberal socialism and property-owning democracy (described 
in more detail below) are consistent with justice as fairness, at least in their ideal forms; the choice 
between them “depends upon the traditions, institutions, and social forces of each country, and its 
particular historical circumstances.”10 Some scholars have argued that Rawls’s openness to liberal 
socialism was a mistake, while others have suggested that justice as fairness is consistent not only 
with property-owning democracy but also with the less-redistributive welfare-state capitalism and 
even laissez-faire capitalism, the last two being economic systems that Rawls explicitly rejected.11 
As we shall see, however, non-basic liberties undercut economic equality even within Rawls’s two 
preferred economic institutions; we do not need to explore less-redistributive systems to show this, 
though that would undoubtedly make the tradeoff of economic equality for liberty more apparent. 
                                                 
9 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 240-2, 248-9; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 138. 
10 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 138; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 242. 
11 For arguments that Rawls should have rejected liberal socialism, see Robert S. Taylor, “Illiberal Socialism,” Social 
Theory and Practice 40 (July 2014): 433-60, and Alan Thomas, Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-
Owning Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapters 8 and 9. For the argument that Rawls should 
have been open to welfare-state capitalism, see Jeppe von Platz, “Democratic Equality and the Justification of Welfare-
State Capitalism,” Ethics 131 (October 2020): 4-33. Lastly, for arguments that Rawls should have endorsed something 
like laissez-faire capitalism, see Daniel Shapiro, “Why Rawlsian Liberals Should Support Free-Market Capitalism,” 
Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (March 1995): 58-85, and John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
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 Liberal socialism requires public ownership of all non-labor factors of production (i.e., land 
and capital) via workers’ cooperatives. It entails universal worker self-management, whether direct 
or indirect (by their election of supervisors), and is therefore anti-statist, emphasizing labor’s right 
to control land, capital, and the production process itself, at the level of the firm.12 Cooperatives 
“carry on their activities within a system of free and workably competitive markets,” particularly 
labor markets: the non-basic liberties of freedom of movement and free choice of occupation that 
are essential for fair equality of opportunity can only be realized when workers are free to join and 
leave cooperatives in different locations and different industries.13 Hence, cooperatives competing 
to attract worker-owners will be forced to pay market rates for labor, rates that will vary widely by 
worker ability and industry, leading to those “differences in earnings as these arise in a competitive 
scheme” (i.e., wage inequality) that Rawls spoke of earlier. 
 This is not the only path, however, by which the serpent of economic inequality enters the 
liberal-socialist garden. The main feature of such socialism is the free association of workers: they 
may not only join and leave cooperatives individually but also found new cooperatives as a group 
and determine the workplace rules of all cooperatives, consistent with the socialist imperative that 
workers share in profits according to a mutually-agreed schedule. Every cooperative is therefore a 
self-constituting, self-regulating demos in competition with others via labor, land, capital, product, 
and service markets. Due to varying entrepreneurial skills, alertness to new opportunities, diligence 
in pursuing them, success in designing workplace rules, and luck above all else, cooperatives will 
enjoy wildly different profit margins and longevity. So, their worker-owners will find their income 
                                                 
12 As he says in “Fairness to Goodness,” “we are to view the principles of justice as constraints that…may be realized 
either by associational socialism or property-owning democracy,” where the former is earlier defined as an “economy 
[in which] the workers in the firm control its capital and means of production” (Rawls, Collected Papers, 267-85, here 
272, 277). Also see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 248, and Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 138. 
13 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 138. 
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determined not just by unequal wages but by unequal profits as well, with the latter being unequal 
because of both the varying success of cooperatives and the varying success of worker-owners in 
negotiating their share of said profits with compatriots. For these reasons, many Marxists reject a 
liberal-socialist regime, viewing it as replete with both capitalist exploitation (of poor firms by rich 
ones) and socialist exploitation (of untalented workers by talented ones).14 Rawls, however, is not 
a Marxist but a liberal who clearly believes that the three non-basic liberties that underwrite liberal 
socialism—namely, freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, and the free association of 
workers—are requirements of justice and therefore more important than the economic inequalities 
they engender.15 
 What is true of liberal socialism is even more true of property-owning democracy, which 
entails the universal private ownership of land and capital (physical, financial, and human) in order 
to “put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs.”16 It offers us a petit-bourgeois rather 
than social-democratic vision of economic democratization, one achieved via inheritance taxation, 
“capitalist” demogrants, etc. Demogrants might come in the form of small-business awards, seed 
money for playing the stock market or buying an annuity to subsidize a low-paying but rewarding 
career (e.g., topiary gardening), educational vouchers, etc. Notice that property-owning democracy 
permits but does not require labor self-management: workers are free to pool their demogrants, for 
instance, and practice voluntary syndicalism, owning and managing their own workplaces with or 
without the support of elected supervisors.17 They may also pick traditional, hierarchical capitalist 
employment relations, whether as employers or as employees. Under property-owning democracy, 
                                                 
14 See, for an example of such a Marxist, John Roemer, Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical Economics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 1, especially 33-4. 
15 Rawls does, however, thoroughly respond to Marx’s critique of liberalism: see Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 176-9. 
16 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 139-40, 160-1. 
17 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 178. 
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citizens are empowered through both competitive markets (for products, services, and production 
factors, especially labor) and demogrants to select any kind of workplace environment they prefer, 
whether by creating them, joining them, or leaving them. 
 Thus, in this regime, the free associationalism of liberal socialism is radically extended and 
transformed. Workers are no longer frog-marched into Fourierism but are instead permitted, if they 
wish, to engage in “capitalist acts between consenting adults,” as Nozick quips—but capitalist acts 
resourced by a redistributive state.18 Or, rather, a predistributive state that avoids the concentration 
of wealth and capital “not by redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, 
so to speak, but instead by ensuring widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital 
(that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period….”19 Although predistribution 
removes rigid class structures from the economy, it also clears another path along which economic 
inequality can enter: by placing “all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs” and compete 
on fair terms, it ensures that their unequal talent, industry, and luck will translate into unequal rank 
and income. The three non-basic liberties discussed earlier—but with the third radically extended 
to facilitate more associational diversity and robust competition—guarantee that property-owning 
democracy will generate even more socioeconomic inequality than liberal socialism. 
 As I noted at the start of this essay, the thesis I have advanced here—namely, that Rawlsian 
liberties (basic and non-basic) restrain and even undermine economic equality—will come as a big 
surprise to many students of Rawls, owing to the interpretive obscurity in which it has languished. 
A few scholars, to be sure, have noticed this aspect of Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism, but they have 
generally responded by suggesting that the liberal bit be expurgated: if liberty undercuts economic 
                                                 
18 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 163. 
19 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 139-40, and Thomas, Republic of Equals, 165-77. 
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equality, then so much the worse for liberty.20 Such egalitarianism-sans-liberalism manages to be 
both politically radical and canonically conservative: Marx (in)famously reminds us in his Critique 
of the Gotha Program that liberal socialism’s pledge that every worker-owner will receive not just 
their wages but their portion of profits is “an unequal right for unequal labor…. It is, therefore, a 
right of inequality, in its content, like every right.”21 The twentieth century served as an unedifying 
testing ground for such rightless egalitarianism, and lest we think its body count a mere historical 
contingency, consider the assessment of Walter Scheidel in his magisterial text The Great Leveler: 
Over the course of about sixty years, from 1917 into the late 1970s…communist 
revolutionary regimes successfully forced down inequality through expropriation, 
redistribution, collectivization, and price-setting. The actual amount of violence 
expended in the implementation of these measures varied hugely between cases, 
with Russia, China, and Cambodia on one end of the spectrum and Cuba and 
Nicaragua on the other. Yet it would go too far to consider violence merely 
incidental to forcible leveling: even though it would in principle have been possible 
for Lenin, Stalin, and Mao to achieve their goals with more limited loss of life, 
sweeping expropriations crucially depended on the application of at least some 
violence and a credible threat of escalation.22 
However limiting it may feel at times, perhaps egalitarians would be wise to retain their liberalism. 
Bourgeois liberties may not thrill the heart, but they might stay the hand of an egalitarian judgment 
gone epically awry. 
                                                 
20 For a recent example see Samuel Arnold, “Putting Liberty in its Place: Rawlsian Liberalism without the Liberalism,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 26 (March 2018): 213-37. 
21 Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 525-41, here 530. 
22 Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 231. 
